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Abstract
This article invites the view that the Europeanization of an antitotalitarian “collective
memory” of communism reveals the emergence of a field of anticommunism. This
transnational field is inextricably tied to the proliferation of state-sponsored and
anticommunist memory institutes across Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), but cannot
be treated as epiphenomenal to their propagation. The diffusion of bodies tasked with
establishing the “true” history of communism reflects, first and foremost, a shift in the
region’s approach to its past, one driven by the right’s frustration over an allegedly
pervasive influence of former communist cliques. Memory institutes spread as the CEE
right progressively perceives their emphasis on research and public education as a safer
alternative to botched lustration processes. However, the field of anticommunism
extends beyond diffusion by seeking to leverage the European Union institutional
apparatus to generate previously unavailable forms of symbolic capital for anticom-
munist narratives. This results in an entirely different challenge, which requires recon-
ciling of disparate ideological and national interests. In this article, I illustrate some of
these nationally diverse, but internationally converging, trajectories of communist
extrication from the vantage point of its main exponents: the anticommunist memory
entrepreneurs, who are invariably found at the helm of memory institutes. Inhabiting
the space around the political, historiographic, and Eurocratic fields, anticommunist
entrepreneurs weave a complex web of alliances that ultimately help produce an
autonomous field of anticommunism.
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Embroiled in a cumbersome effort to come to terms with its Nazi past for decades,
Europe is now haunted by the specter of a new memory. The Holocaust’s singular
standing as a negative founding formula of European integration, the culmination of
long-standing efforts from prominent Western leaders (Levy 2010; Troebst 2010), is
increasingly challenged by a memory of communism, which disputes its uniqueness.
The Platform of European Memory and Conscience (henceforth Platform) conveyed
this message in its exhibition “Totalitarianism in Europe: Fascism—Nazism—Com-
munism,” open between 2012 and 2016. The exhibit travelled to museums, memorials,
foundations, city halls, parliaments, cultural centers, and universities in 15 European
countries, stretching from Ireland to Romania, and was purported to “improve public
awareness and education about the gravest crimes committed by the totalitarian
dictatorships” (Platform 2013).
The exhibit’s panels alternated between communist and Nazi “totalitarian
crimes” in several countries, depicting war crimes, victims, the faces of perpe-
trators, and the number of condemnations. These numbers alerted the public to
an alleged double standard between the justice given to victims of Nazi
totalitarianism—epitomized by the Nuremberg trials—and those of communism.
Affirming “a clear historical connection between Nazism and Communism,” the
organizers implicitly deem the entire communist experience grimmer, as it
“continued to perpetrate international crimes … until the very end of its
existence.” Furthermore, while claiming to mirror the “current state of knowl-
edge, based on research in the countries presented” (Platform Platform 2012a),
the exhibition mentioned none of the local drivers of communism, a burgeoning
area of historiographic research.
The most prominent of the Platform’s members—the state-sponsored and unwaver-
ingly anticommunist memory institutes that have come to dominate memory-making in
CEE—retrieved and interpreted the photographs and documents in the exhibition. Headed
by political appointees and staffed with historians, memory institutes engage in a wide
array of practices, including archival research, exhibits, teacher trainings, and lustration,
stirring controversy along the way. The practices of these institutes are systematically
embedded in an antitotalitarian conceptual universe, one that, their many critics claim, is
inextricably linked to domestic political struggles. A link noticeable in the exhibit itself,
which noted that “the consequences of terror … last long after end of the regime” and
include “widespread corruption and malfunctioning democratic institutions.”
The panel exhibit occurred in the context of a string of EU-sponsored conferences,
declarations, and commemorations reflecting the same antitotalitarian outlook. Most
notably, in 2008, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) passed a resolution
establishing August 23 as the European Day of Remembrance for the victims of
Stalinism and Nazism. This was the first time the EU opened the door to a potential
equalization of communism and Nazism, a long-held view among conservative circles
in CEE and beyond—and it was not the last. A 2009 European Parliament (EP)
resolution on European Conscience and Totalitarianism called for “support for net-
working and cooperation among national research institutes specialising in the subject
of totalitarian history” (European Parliament 2009a), in a clear reference to anticom-
munist memory institutes.
This article makes two key contributions. Empirically, it rejects a dominant inter-
pretation of these events as a political expression of CEE’s will to come to terms with
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its past (Kattago 2009; Leggewie 2010; Verovšek 2015), which one observer described
as a moment of “post-EU accession ideological decolonization” (Mälksoo 2009, p.
656). Such accounts have failed to address the region’s penchant for political
instrumentalization of the past (Enyedi 2005; Mark 2010; Nalepa 2010), providing
sound reason to marvel at post-communist elites’ seeming articulation of a consensual
regional message. A significant portion of the memory studies literature takes on the
subject, thus reiterating a stubborn temptation to reify collective memory, that is, to
confound the actual discursive manifestation of a narrative with the contingent social
processes that sustain it. Unpacking these processes, this article argues that the post-
communist right’s desire to complete an “unfinished revolution” (Mark 2010) drives
the Europeanization of antitotalitarianism. The “unfinished revolution” concept relays
the idea that communists retain a toxic and persisting influence over contemporary
democratic institutions and that these communists should be removed from public life.
These efforts, I shall argue, originate in the right’s perception of a failed transitional
justice, patent in the persistence of a former communist political left and of memory
institutes as an adroit corrective. This corrective is not without substantial opposition,
which forces its proponents constantly to carve new spaces of legitimation and
autonomy. The creation of a European field of anticommunism is perhaps the most
glaring example of this.
However, additionally, the case at hand invites theoretical reflection. Anticom-
munist memory institutes signal the rise of a novel power arrangement, one that
regulates the transactions between politics and historiography, and which has
diffused across the CEE region, particularly since the 2000s. This diffusion allowed
for the emergence of a transnational exchange of knowledge, which accrued to the
benefit of these institutes and refrained from interfering in their respective domestic
prerogatives. Yet recent EU-level initiatives on antitotalitarianism have suggested a
more complex story, one of a continuously evolving power arrangement entangling
memory institutes, political elites, and MEPs from countries with idiosyncratic
trajectories of communist extrication. By reconciling various oppositions—
between nationalism and Europeanism, between liberalism and conservatism—
and by forcing an EU-wide reckoning with its official memory, this ensemble
exhibits an autonomy and constitutive power that the mere sum of its components
lacks. Bourdieu has posited fields as both bundles of relations (Bourdieu and
Wacquant 1992, p. 97) and as spaces of struggle for autonomy and legitimation
(Bourdieu 1996), producing effects by nature of their very structure, rather than as a
result of simple mechanical aggregation (Wacquant 2016, pp. 16–17). Hence, I
argue that we can best describe this power arrangement as a relatively autonomous
field of anticommunism, one whose effects we must not infer from only the sum of
its individual components, but from the multiple transactions and alliances that hold
them together.
In consonance with this interpretation, I concentrate not only on the visible members
of this transnational alliance, but additionally and especially on the brokers who sustain
it, a species of memory entrepreneurs. Memory entrepreneurs have been defined as
actors seeking social recognition and political legitimacy for their preferred narrative of
the past (Jelin 2003, p. 33). In the post-communist context, this definition, which
insufficiently explores the entrepreneurial dimension of the concept, encompasses
much more than mere brokers. The term memory entrepreneurs does not apply to the
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prominent anticommunist dissidents of the 1990s, such as Václav Havel or Adam
Michnik; or to the contemporary anticommunists who recurrently earn headlines in the
Western press, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán; and nor to pure
academics, although memory entrepreneurs invariably possess scholarly qualifications.
Rather, anticommunist memory entrepreneurs (henceforth anticommunist entrepre-
neurs) share commonalities with all the mentioned actors: With dissidents, they have
a record of opposing “totalitarianism,” but diverge from most liberal dissidents, who
accept socialist successor parties as legitimate partners in the democratic game. With
historians, they share a passion for gauging the past, albeit one primarily driven by a
commitment to educating an apathetic public on the dangers of communism. In line
with right-wing forces, they seek to exclude substantial portions of the left from power
positions, although politicians’ realistic compromises are a frequent source of disquiet.
Anticommunist entrepreneurs’ distinctiveness thus extends beyond a political ideology
shared in wider circles. Rather, the term refers to a select group of actors whose
biographies are spent shifting between politics and academia, equipping them with
an “ability to keep multiple evaluative principles in play and to exploit the resulting
friction of their interplay” (Stark 2009, p. 15). This translates to an aptitude to negotiate
compromises between scholarly knowledge and political ideology, between historio-
graphic practice and political action, and eventually between domestic demands and the
exigencies of Europeanization. Their entrepreneurial singularity is most visible when
they recombine resources from across these political, historiographic, and Eurocratic
fields to generate innovative practices and unlikely alliances, all the while maintaining
ideological coherence. Their contribution to post-communist memory politics thus lies
in a penchant for accommodating just enough diversity and rallying just enough
resources behind a common ideological goal.
This article focuses on four anticommunist entrepreneurs, each offering a hook
to a distinct national or international trajectory: The late Janusz Kurtyka, former
head of Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance, and perhaps the most
versatile of anticommunist entrepreneurs; Mária Schmidt, the perennial head of
Hungary’s Terror House, whose political clout is unmatched among her peers;
Vladimir Tismăneanu, former head of the Institute for the Investigation of
Communist Crimes in Romania, and academically the most prestigious of the
group; and Neela Winkelmann, managing director of the Platform, whose cos-
mopolitan profile epitomizes the European turn of memory politics. By exploring
their biographies and brokering practices, I aim to reveal how the national
trajectories they represent have coalesced to form a field of anticommunism.
While doing so, I reveal key power dynamics involved in discussions over the
significance of communism in CEE: the dominance of antitotalitarianism, forms
of resistance to it, the symbolic deficit of the left, and the partial cooptation of
historiography. This article proceeds as follows: In the first part, I briefly
consider how field theory can be applied to collective memory studies. Second,
I offer an overview of my methods and case selection. Third, I trace the
idiosyncrasies of the Polish, Hungarian, and Romanian trajectories of communist
extrication. Fourth, I expand on the origins and consequences of anticommunist
memory institutes’ diffusion. Fifth, I assess the Europeanization of
antitotalitarianism as a case of field emergence. The concluding section discusses
the implications of this case, particularly for theorizing why fields emerge.
Theory and Society
A field-theoretical approach to collective memory
A detailed discussion of the collective memory concept falls beyond the purview of this
article, however, a small number of considerations are required. I follow Olick in
treating collective memory as “a wide variety of mnemonic products and practices” that
represent different “moments in a dynamic process” (Olick 2006, p. 12) of societal
negotiation and struggle for hegemony. This definition contrasts with popular—and
frequently scholarly—understandings of “collective memory” as synonymous with
“hard” identity, connoting sameness, group boundedness, and permanence across time
and space (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, pp. 10–11). Thus, studies of memory politics
have conflated collective memory as process and “collective memory” (henceforth with
quotation marks) as identity. By differentiating between them, scholarly attention shifts
to the processes and practices by which memory moves from struggle, contestation, and
instability to a hard identity that projects sameness and permanence.
I suggest envisioning such struggles over definitions of “collective memory” as
occurring in the context of Bourdieusian fields. Bourdieu’s view of a social world
driven by complex webs of relations, rather than direct causal lines, led him to replace
the vague notion of “society” with the more concrete social topography of fields. He
defines a field as “a network, or configuration, of objective relations between positions”
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 97), which functions as an arena of struggle for
specific prizes such as symbolic legitimacy and power. Fields are organized around
specific types of capital, referring to species of power or dominance recognized as
legitimate within the field (1992, p. 114). Typically, fields are defined by economic,
cultural, social, and, of particular relevance for our purposes, symbolic capital, which
designates informal but socially resonant and powerful categories of honor and pres-
tige. This article operationalizes two forms of symbolic capital: 1) the symbolic capital
of anticommunism, gained through an ability to portray oneself as having either fought
the communist system as a dissident or its “remains” in post-communist politics; and 2)
scientific capital, which refers to officially accredited forms of scientific and scholarly
knowledge and resources that command authority. Capital possessions are central to
determining an actor’s field positions, however, the social practices observed within
fields are not established simply by the said positions: Instead, movement within fields
occurs as a result of an unconscious relationship between a habitus and a field
(Bourdieu 1993, p. 76). Another central concept in Bourdieu’s social theory, habitus,
refers to the set of embodied and unconscious cultural dispositions that filter actors’
perceptions of, and behaviors towards, the world. Fundamentally, habitus reflects a
unique social trajectory, one that cannot be reduced to a “replica of a single social
structure,” but represents “a dynamic, multiscalar, and multilayered set of schemata
subject to ‘permanent revision’ in practice” (Wacquant 2016, p. 64).
We can easily locate mnemonic struggles within fields as diverse as politics, the arts
and journalism, all of which arguably furnish mechanisms of socialization into collec-
tive memory narratives. However, the preponderance of a given “collective memory” is
less contingent on struggles in any given field than its overall societal resonance. While
in relatively consensual societies resonance is continuously ensured by the reproduction
of coherent structures of socialization, in less consensual settings, proponents of a
narrative of the past may struggle to impose their narratives across fields. By way of
illustration, politicians may make memory central to their political agendas, but will
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rarely overextend themselves by directly entering historiographic, journalistic, or
artistic controversies. Their participation in such debates could easily be construed as
illegitimate. A more effective approach consists in enlisting allies—historians, journal-
ists, artists—whose position in their respective fields is perceived as legitimate to
outsiders.
However, when memory struggles are distributed across fields, how does memory
assume the semblance of an identity? How are the multiple mnemonic struggles
occurring across fields amalgamated, negotiated, and re-adapted to produce the sort
of coherence an identity demands? Field theory has only recently witnessed growth in
interest regarding the issue of relationships between fields. As Bourdieu himself
conceded to Wacquant, relations between fields do not seem to follow transhistoric
laws (1992, p. 109), presupposing the latter to be governed by ad hoc orders. Eyal
(2013) suggests these orders develop in an area of friction or overlap between fields
where different temporalities, paces, and rhythms are somehow reconciled through
sustained interaction. Envisioning such orders requires reconsidering the role of bound-
aries as lines that mark the end of one field and the beginning of another, and starting to
treat them as the indispensable social entity they are: areas with enough volume to
accommodate the struggles, flows, and exchanges between fields (Eyal 2013, p. 162).
In Eyal’s view, these interstitial spaces generate mechanisms indispensable to the
existence of fields as relatively bounded and coherent entities, while also allowing the
mobilization of resources and alliances across them. This is the case particularly when
massive social or cultural changes occur, during which the system of prevailing
distinctions and classifications is disrupted and new social topographies may emerge
(Eyal 2013, p. 179). As the literature shows, such topographies are often fields: In his
appraisal of the origins of the French literary field, Bourdieu saw salons as “genuine
articulations between the fields” of artists and politicians who discussed the distribution
of material and symbolic rewards from the state (Bourdieu 1996, p. 51). This was a
response to a sudden surge in secondary school diplomas during the early nineteenth
century, with thousands of newcomers from the humanities unable to capitalize on their
degrees and increasingly opting for literary professions. In the same vein, Steinmetz
described colonial states as fields produced by the intersection of a colonial economic
field and the metropolitan state, with the purpose of producing new governance and
ethnographic practices (Steinmetz 2008, pp. 596, 602). Likewise, Medvetz (2012)
traced the rise of a field of think-tanks to structural transformations propelled by the
institutionalization of an academic, and later bureaucratic, field. Think-tanks would find
a niche in the regulation of flows of knowledge and personnel at the crossroads of
political, intellectual, economic, and media fields. The emergence of a field (henceforth
field emergence) thus reflects an “effort to carve out some degree of autonomy from
society-wide dominant powers” (Steinmetz 2011, p. 54) in the wake of momentous
social transformations.
Organizational sociologists have weighed in on the debate, attempting to theorize
field emergence beyond its mere structural preconditions. For instance, DiMaggio and
Powell posited field emergence as a process of organic self-development driven by an
increase in mutual interactions and a sense of common enterprise (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983). However, organizational sociologists are generally wedded to a less
agonistic and “micro” understanding of fields when compared to Bourdieu’s, who
emphasizes conflict and complexity. Yet the former have long alerted analysts to the
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role of entrepreneurship in producing novel social arrangements through the recombi-
nation of existing elements, suggesting the sort of translation and recombinant practices
Eyal expected to find in the spaces between fields. For instance, Fligstein argued that
field emergence is driven by “skilled social actors” (Fligstein 2001) entrusted with
translating existing rules via persuasion, cooperation, and accommodation of other
groups to produce compromise identities and local orders. More recently, Stark defined
entrepreneurs as actors with an “ability to keep multiple evaluative principles in play
and to exploit the resulting friction of their interplay” (Stark 2009, p. 15). Both
contributions help us envision entrepreneurs as generative actors who operate across
fields and are comfortable mobilizing their respective “evaluative principles.” Howev-
er, both also fall short of accounting for how entrepreneurs come to possess these
recombinant skills.
I draw three preliminary conclusions from this brief discussion on field emergence: First,
as Marin and Gregg (Martin and Gregg 2015, p. 52) point out, our difficulty in studying
fields as delimited and bounded realities requires a “de-emphasis on the study ‘of’ fields as
entities in favor of an exploration of fundamental field theoretical processes” as the one
revealed by the problematic of field emergence. Second, a friction between social orders,
caused by a transformation in the social structure, must occur for any kind of interstitial
space to “thicken” its boundaries; it is from here that fields may emerge. Third, this “space
between fields” must be willfully exploited by actors who recruit allies, translate interests,
and convert and exchange the capitals they bring into play. The remainder of this article
attempts to account for the mechanisms of field emergence by engaging with both structural
preconditions and an agency grounded in habitus, all the while showing structure and
agency interconnection through practice. This account is grounded in Bourdieu’s social
theory, therefore, the hypothesized field of anticommunism must be tested against the
features of a Bourdieusian field, understood as1: a) a space of mutual recognition in which
actors oriented towards a common function engage in both contest and cooperation. This
proceeds from the fact that a) “all the agents that are involved in a field share a certain
number of fundamental interests, namely everything that is linked to the very existence of
the field,” leading to “an objective complicity which underlies all the antagonisms”
(Bourdieu 1993, p. 73); b) These interlocking antagonisms then give way to a “competition
among different forms of competence, at once hostile and complementary” (Bourdieu 1986,
p. 821), producing a field-specific division of labor; c) a dominant capital or combination
thereof towards which actors orient their struggles, establish hierarchies, and define legiti-
mate forms of expertise; d) a desire for autonomy from overpowering societal forces, and
since processes of autonomization tend to be “accompanied by an increase in the standards
expected of anyone seeking right of entry to the field (Bourdieu 1991, p. 177), e) field-
specific membership rules that function as more or less institutionalized “barriers to entry”
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 100).
Methods and case selection
Data was gathered through prosopography, in-depth interviews, and documentary
sources. Between November 2012 and May 2014, I conducted a total of 38 interviews
1 The bold italics will help reiterate these features through the empirical data in the fifth section.
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with anticommunist entrepreneurs and historiographic and other scholarly experts.
Against the background of historical analysis, their subjective and often contradictory
accounts of the relations among the fields they inhabit were pieced together to
approximate their objective structure. This picture was complemented with documen-
tary sources, including cooperation agreements, mission statements, organigrams, and
project descriptions, retrieved directly from 11 memory institutes as well as the
Platform. An additional batch of documents was obtained from EU sources: Official
declarations on the Union’s historical legacy, EP debate transcripts on European
memory, and EP public hearing reports and presidency programs. Finally, I deployed
elite prosopography (Stone 1971) to reveal the biographies and field positions of four
anticommunist entrepreneurs, whose data we obtained by consulting curriculum vitae
and biographical webpages and through the conducting of elite interviews.
The four anticommunist entrepreneurs selected represent encompassing national
trajectories of communist extrication, while offering a hook to their eventual accom-
modation in a European setting. The Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, and Czech/
Europeanization trajectories were chosen due to their influence at the EU level—they
are the most populous post-communist nations in the EU. Furthermore, the cases shared
commonalities, such as frustration with transitional justice, and persistence of the post-
communist left, as well as peculiarities—state commissions in Romania, the creation of
the anticommunist memory institute model in Poland, a dissident tradition in foreign
policy in the Czech Republic. In summary, each national trajectory offered a palette of
shared and contrasting interests and sensitivities that allowed for exploration of the
challenges and nuances of their reconciliation in a European space.
Post-communist transitional justice
CEE is united by a shared experience of state socialism and a dominant desire for
European integration, but the paths from the former (very diverse state socialist
regimes) to the latter (privatization and increasing convergence to EU standards) had
distinct shapes. Romania, one of the most repressive state socialist regimes, was the
scene of a violent revolution, while Czechoslovakia had a peaceful one, whereas in
Poland and Hungary, communist doctrinaire leaders gave way to a technocratic class
before the transition, and this same group proved pivotal in facilitating economic and
political reform. Within post-communist political fields, understood as domestic arenas
of struggle for power and legitimation, the collapse of state socialism introduced the
theme of a “return to Europe.” Imposing an overriding concern to comply with EU
political and economic standards (its acquis communautaire), this theme provided a
direction to a disoriented polity, but simultaneously reduced space for programmatic
differentiation. Emphasis was thus redirected to a symbolic/identitarian dimension,
where struggles to monopolize the symbolic capital of anticommunism became in-
creasingly central to political struggle, shaping and fracturing politics to this day
(Bernhard and Kubik 2014).
Anticommunism was more than an identity on which to legitimize the political fields
that emerged from the ashes of communist regimes—it was a prolongation of antito-
talitarian frameworks developed by both liberal and conservative dissident movements
in the 1970s. For both groups, populated by a substantial number of historians and
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other intellectuals, labelling communist regimes as “totalitarian” helped draw a clear
line between the regime and the opposition, in order to mobilize the population. There
was little agreement beyond this pragmatic compromise, with liberals advocating
human rights and civic patriotism and conservatives underscoring nationalism and
“national memory” as repertoires of resistance (Kopeček 2012, p. 590). Persuaded that
totalitarianism offered an inaccurate portrayal of everyday life under communism—
despite its political utility—most liberal dissidents came to modify the notion to convey
the supposed totalitarian ambitions, rather than power, of communist elites (Brier 2011,
p. 204). Many political formations of post-communism would emerge out of these
dissident communities of intellectuals, furthering a traditional blurring of the lines
between politics and scholarship in the region.
Three principal positions emerged with regard to the thorny issue of transitional
justice: a (left-) liberal stance, inspired by calls on citizens to assess introspectively
their own role in reproducing communist power (Michnik and Havel 1993); an
occasionally liberal, though more often conservative antitotalitarianism that drew a
sharp line between victims and perpetrators; and a modernizing/third-way social-
democratic outlook that found a focus on the past unproductive and, less explicitly,
acknowledged communism’s mixed heritage. Attempts to deliver transitional justice in
post-communism were invariably coopted by political competition between these
groups, causing popular exhaustion with memory politics and ultimately laying the
foundation for the appearance of anticommunist memory institutes (henceforth memory
institutes).
Poland
The Polish transition offers a paradigmatic case of negotiated transition, where-
by liberal and conservative dissidents, led by the Solidarity opposition trade
union, sat down with reformist communist party officials to negotiate a change
of regime. The latter successfully sidelined communist hardliners before enter-
ing negotiations with the opposition over transitioning to a democratic institu-
tional framework.
As became increasingly clear, the negotiated nature of transition did little to quell
resentment among those who saw representatives of the old regime as unduly profiting
from the ensuing privatization of state assets. While regime opponents had informally
agreed to forgive and draw a “thick line” to mark off the communist past, liberal and
conservative parties quickly adopted anticommunist political identities. As early as
1992, a liberal-conservative coalition government promoted press leaks of a list of 64
supposed former agents remaining in parliament or government. The unsubstantiated
nature of the list sparked an outcry that led to the resignation of Jan Olszewski’s
government, as well as calls to regulate lustration. In 1993, Social Democracy of the
Republic of Poland (SdRP), the successor of the Polish United Worker’s Party, won the
parliamentary elections following a decline in living standards caused by market
reforms. In the years thereafter, the right-wing opposition would ride popular resent-
ment against SdRP, which had profited from leasing communist-party-owned buildings
to private enterprises and from partial privatization of its media empire (Hashim 2002,
pp. 43–47).
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In 1997, with the left still in government, parliament agreed on a lustration law that
allowed for vetting commissions in various important sectors of public life. Lustration
laws were mild, leading at most to public shaming, but never outright dismissal, yet
among former opponents of the communist regime, many were becoming wary of the
process. Prominent liberal dissident Adam Michnik claimed that, as a result of lustra-
tion, “[p]eople who worked in the communist-era bureaucracy, even if they committed
no crime, are penalized because of an affiliation with others higher up in the leadership”
(Michnik and Dulzin 2002, p. 519). However, among the most dissatisfied with the
state of affairs was a group of conservative, Solidarity-affiliated dissidents who began
calling for a new institution that would reenergize the process of communist extrication.
In 1998, following a heated parliamentary debate, the Institute of National Remem-
brance (IPN) was born, inheriting staff, archives, and other infrastructure from the
Central Commission for the Investigation of German Crimes in Poland, a body created
during communism to prosecute crimes committed in the course of the Second World
War.
While the memory institute’s promoters gained inspiration from the German Stasi
Records Agency (BStU) strictly tasked with assessing the role of East Germany’s
secret police, IPN was given the broader responsibility of managing national historical
memory, namely by prosecuting communist and Nazi “crimes against the Polish
nation,” classifying and regulating access to communist-era files, and producing
academic research for public education purposes. The institute’s prosecutorial powers
triggered sustained opposition, not only from the former communist left, but from
liberal daily Gazeta Wyborcza and its editor in chief, Michnik. Liberal intellectuals
warned that rather than regulate lustration, the institute would turn it into an instrument
of revenge against representatives of the former regime, although criticism waned after
a group of IPN historians played a prominent role in investigating Polish participation
in the Holocaust. However, those fearing politicization were vindicated after the
electoral victory of the conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party in 2005 and the
election of anticommunist entrepreneur Janusz Kurtyka as head of IPN.
PiS had embraced the narrative of an “unfinished revolution.” The commu-
nist successor party, now called the Democratic Left Alliance, remained influ-
ential, having elected President Aleksander Kwaśniewski for two consecutive
terms (1995, 2000). PiS repeatedly claimed communists had captured the Polish
state, and promised to cleanse the country of hidden communist networks,
adopting the line of communism as inherently evil and anti-Polish. The party’s
campaign represented an attempt to monopolize the symbolic capital of anti-
communism: PiS could argue that they had not compromised with communists,
having played a minor role in the 1989 round-table negotiations, while its
relatively younger ranks were less likely to have collaborated with the former
regime. Crucially, PiS would find a strong ally in IPN, where many historians
shared their diagnosis of the country and perceived their role in politically
proactive terms:
Communists, and I mean communists, are still a very influential group in all of
our countries … there are branches of the economy that are stuffed with former
secret service officials: the banking system, telecommunications, energy transfer
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… they have influence in the media, newspapers, it is difficult to fight it. (Ł.
Michalski, personal communication, January 2013)
Kurtyka’s appointment as IPN president heralded the institution’s embrace of a con-
ception of history and politics as inevitably intertwined, effectively thickening the
space between the political and historiographic fields. With a political formation that
dates to his opposition activism in the 1980s, involving anything from distributing
leaflets to clandestine radio transmissions, Kurtyka was more than a historian. Wishing
to raise political awareness by popularizing history, Kurtyka contributed to clandestine
publications as a doctoral student at the Institute of History of Sciences in Warsaw and
later offered underground lectures on World War II and post-War history. In post-
communism, he obtained a doctoral degree from the Institute of History of the Polish
Academy of Sciences, after which he completed a postdoctoral degree from
Jagiellonian University and joined the Scientific Council of the Academy. His post-
communist trajectory is no less connected to politics: throughout the 1990s, he joined
various conservative parties and, in 1993, ran for Parliament for the Catholic Electoral
Committee. During this time, Kurtyka developed strong ties with veteran organizations,
lobbying state officials to fund their publications, decorate their representatives, and
establish commemorations to honor veterans (Musiał 2012).
His versatility was largely responsible for, and amply evident prior to, his appoint-
ment as IPN President, as he was appointed director of IPN’s Krakow branch in 1998.
Using negotiating skills and contacts unavailable to most historians, Kurtyka offered
researchers and public educators access to previously unavailable archival documenta-
tion from communist-era police, courts, prisons, and other state and local authorities.
Often acting autonomously from IPN headquarter wishes, his branch was also the first
in the country to establish an electronic inventory for outside researchers. Kurtyka
clearly prioritized the Krakow Public Education Office, which was the only IPN
structure to create a publication series independently from Warsaw, as well as the first
to organize an outdoor exhibit. Furthermore, his branch created training centers and
teaching aids for teachers, a practice followed by memory institutes throughout the
region to this day, and concluded a cooperation agreement with various media, most
notably the conservative daily Dziennik, where IPN historians were granted a weekly
column (Musiał 2012). As a former IPN colleague of Kurtyka’s notes, the emphasis he
pushed on public education was not to be taken for granted at that time:
In the original idea it was not expected that research and public education would
expand so significantly … the idea was to put the archives outside political
control into an independent institution. In the law the educational research
activities is only in one article, whereas the investigation of files, archives, occupy
chapters of the bill. But the research and education branch expanded to become as
big as the other branches, and in the public and the media this became more
visible. (Krzysztof Persak, p.c. 2013)
Kurtyka’s ideological commitment, as well as his entrepreneurial ability to diffuse a
coherent message across fields, led him to the Presidency of IPN, in a move that also
certified the institution’s political vulnerability. Having been elected by a board of 11
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members voted by Parliament, of which only one was of the opposition,2 Kurtyka was
free to purge IPN’s central positions. As the former director of IPN’s Bureau of Public
Education notes, this resulted in an influx of politically proactive historians who
profoundly changed the institution:
Kurtyka supported a new group of historians and archivists who identified
themselves with the political and historical line of PiS. There was an alliance
and cooperation between PiS and Kurtyka, and this had great influence on books
published, conferences organized, this new line had several meanings, a greater
focus on exposing people who were presumably agents of the communist security
apparatus and were active in public life. (Paweł Machcewicz, p.c. 2013)
A harsher lustration law, passed in 2007, would make IPN responsible for lustration, in
what was perhaps the last gasp of a prosecutorial approach to the past in Poland.
Kurtyka had relaxed regulations for media access to archives and had ultimately
encouraged IPN historians to denounce anyone suspected of harboring ties to the
former regime. This had been a source of controversial, unregulated leaks in the
past—a trend epitomized by the accusations against former dissident and Polish
President Lech Wałęsa (Nalepa 2010, pp. 17–19). However, the new lustration law
soon encountered trouble, with the judiciary deeming key articles of it unconstitutional,
thereby rendering it largely ineffectual. Research and public education would hence-
forth dominate public perception of the institute’s activities, which remains an object of
regional envy among anticommunist entrepreneurs to this day, with 2500 historians,
80 km of archives, and 1000 educational projects yearly (Łukasz Michalski, p.c. 2013).
In a testament to his proximity to political power, Kurtyka died in April 2010 after
the presidential plane in which he travelled with then Polish President Lech Kaczyński
and several other high-level officials crashed on its way to a ceremony in Smolensk,
Russia. For anticommunist entrepreneurs, his legacy would set a powerful “vision” and
a “building block” (Winkelmann, p.c. 2012) for the ensuing Europeanization of
antitotalitarianism.
Hungary
Hungary was home to the least repressive regime among the four under examination.
The most traumatic event of communist rule occurred in 1956, when Warsaw Pact
troops entered Hungarian territory to quash an anti-Soviet popular revolt, causing
thousands of casualties. As in Poland, the transition was negotiated between reformist
communists and dissidents, leading to the rapid reintegration of the communist suc-
cessor party in the country’s democratic life. While lustration targeted former
communist-era officials and collaborators, laws were relatively mild, leading to public
shaming at most, particularly as the political right feared being equally compromised by
a harsher approach. Lustration became widely perceived as a mere political weapon and
2 This law was amended in 2010, to allow leading universities and history departments to propose the
candidates that parliament may subsequently consider for the board.
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a distraction from economic mismanagement and failed reform (Kiss 2006, p. 927), and
memory politics quickly assumed purely symbolic undertones.
In particular, 1956 would become symbolic of many of the political battles of post-
communism: the event was pivotal to the political birth of Viktor Orbán, not only a key
figure in the politicization of anticommunism, but a participant in its history. Hungary’s
most successful politician, with four terms as prime minister (1998–2002; 2010-
present), Orbán introduced himself to the world as the liberal leader of the Fidesz
opposition movement in 1989, when Hungary’s reformist socialist regime allowed him
to speak at the ceremonial reburial of communist revolutionary leader Imre Nagy. Nagy
had been executed in 1958 and was condemned as a counter-revolutionary for decades,
yet in 1989, authorities agreed to rehabilitate his image with a reburial. His funeral gave
Orbán a chance to stake his anticommunist credentials in front of a huge crowd: While
communist leaders were clearly moving the country in a democratic direction, Orbán
accused them of failing young generations and said they deserve no gratitude (Csipke
2011, p. 100).
His performance impressed many, not least Mária Schmidt, the region’s most
enduring anticommunist entrepreneur: “I was always anticommunist. I first ‘fell in
love’ with Orbán in 1989 when he gave his speech.… It was the most important speech
of that era in Hungary.… I said, ‘Oh my God, he’s the bomb!’” (McMahon 2019).
Having graduated in history and German literature before the regime change, Schmidt
became assistant professor in history at the Pázmány Péter Catholic University in 1996.
With Orbán’s 1998 election, she moved to politics, to become his chief advisor, a
position that would earn her the nickname of Orbán’s “court historian” and allow her to
assist Fidesz’s voyage from a liberal to a conservative party. Her entry into politics did
not signal an abandonment of academia: In 1999, within a year of her new advisory
position, Schmidt received a PhD in history, which allowed her to become an associate
professor at her university and a full professor by 2010.
Schmidt’s embrace by Fidesz culminated the party’s ideological shift on every key
issue except anticommunism, which was expressed in an uncompromising stance
towards the socialists (Enyedi 2005). The advantages of this strategy were not always
obvious. In a familiar story for the region, in 1990, Hungarians elected the conservative
Hungarian Democratic Forum to conduct painful economic reforms, causing a dramatic
decrease in living standards. The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) capitalized on this
dissatisfaction to refashion itself as a competent and pro-European party of economic
managers, and thereafter returned to power, starting in the mid-1990s (Bozoki and
Ishiyama 2002, p. 5). As with the Polish left, the party was populated by former
communist-era managers who, unlike the old communist cadres that disappeared from
public life, had clearly benefited from privatization (Eyal et al. 1997). Their insider
status posed a double bind, allowing socialists to claim “ideology-free” economic
expertise, but also constituting a tacit acknowledgment of complicity with the defunct
regime. Regardless, their modernizing message appealed to otherwise anticommunist
liberals with whom the socialists would form a governing alliance in 1994. This
development gave conservative anticommunists the opportunity to redefine Hungarian
politics as a struggle between true anticommunists and regime accomplices: “the
Liberals, who pretended to be Anticommunist and then switched sides, we will never
forgive them. You never forgive traitors,” was Schmidt’s crude analysis of that
momentous event (McMahon 2019).
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After winning the 1998 election, Fidesz would begin blurring the space between the
political and historiographic fields, relocating resources away from academic research
institutes to new research bodies widely perceived as politicized. With Schmidt as chief
advisor, the government moved to defund two independent research institutes: The
Institute of Political History (defunded by HUF 50 million, roughly USD 230,000 at
the time) and the Institute for the Research of 1956 (by HUF 67 million). The latter had
long been a target of conservative criticism, as its liberal historians stood accused of
overemphasizing leftist and reform communist participants in the revolution (Kiss
2015, p. 248). The sums were reallocated to the newly founded Public Foundation
for the Research of Central and Eastern Europe, headed by Schmidt herself. From
within this foundation three formally distinct institutions were created: The twentieth
Century Institute, the twenty-first Century Institute, and the Terror House Museum, all
of which saw Schmidt appointed director general (Hamvay 2015).
While Hungary inherited several institutions and scholars from a relatively autono-
mous communist-era historiography field, elsewhere in the region, the cash-stripped
sector proved vulnerable to the prevailing zeitgeist or to outright cooptation. The 1990s
brought about a dismissal of communist era scholarship and embracing of a positivist
and fact-collecting orientation, justified in terms of emancipation from ideological
control (Ferenc Laczó, p.c. 2013). This empowered a subgroup of right-wing historians
intent on depicting “Hungarian history as a general success story occasionally
interrupted by … intrusions from ‘outside’” (Trencsényi and Apor 2007, p. 45). Its
younger members in particular were relatively isolated from the methodological main-
stream of the discipline, but saw this isolation as a result of leftist, communist-era
biases. Together with other junior historians struggling to find employment in history
departments, these conservative youngsters provided the backbone for Schmidt’s
politics of history (Péter Apor, p.c. 2013).
The Terror House, firmly controlled by Schmidt, would rise as the crown jewel of an
institutional apparatus reconciling political and historical practice, and as the largest
and best endowed museum of communism in the region. Orbán delivered the inaugural
opening speech outside the museum building, in what seemed like a campaign event.
The Terror House was shutting the door on a “long and sad 20th century at the last
minute.” Orbán declared to the crowds six weeks ahead of the 2002 election that he
would lose to the socialists: “At the last minute because it threatened to continue”
(Berrnuli 2002).
The museum’s building, previously used by the Hungarian national socialists and
later by the communist secret police, conveys continuity between fascism and com-
munism: Visitors are guided through its cellars, interrogation rooms, and gallows,
where both Nazis and communists tortured and executed political prisoners. While
putatively concerned with all forms of totalitarianism, all but two of the museum’s two
dozen rooms are dedicated to communism. Upon entering, visitors are welcomed by a
“wall of perpetrators” depicting photographs of former communist leaders and secret
agents, many of them the fathers of contemporary liberal politicians. Thereby, present
and past are once again connected.
The Terror House, which meanwhile became the object of ritualistic excursions for
school children around the country, infuriated socialists and liberals, who toyed with
the idea of renaming it the “House of Reconciliation.” However, the left ultimately
opted for a 40% slash to the museum’s funding, to which a confident Schmidt
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responded by threatening to close the museum, forcing socialist Péter Medgyessy to
backtrack. Schmidt’s confidence is revealing:
130,000 people came to the opening of the Terror House, if they try to overhaul it
or close it down then they will have again 130,000 or more come here, and they
[the leftists] do not want that, because anyway they have a legitimation problem.
(Mária Schmidt, p.c., May 2013)
Moreover, the prime minister agreed to provide subsidies from his own allocation to the
museum, which he effectively legitimated through an official visit (Kiss 2015, p. 248),
and the socialists would relinquish all ambitions to change the composition of the
museum’s foundation board (Hamvay 2015).
Medgyessi’s about-face tells a larger story of the left’s symbolic vulnerability in
the region. While the socialists have occasionally invoked their role in initiating the
transition from what was already a “reformist” regime, their attempts to formulate a
historical narrative were negligible prior to the political irruption of Ferenc
Gyurcsány. Having joined the socialist government in 2002 as an advisor, by
2004 Gyurcsány was attempting to tackle the past head-on with the manifesto
“Dare to be on the left.” In his manifesto, he attacked the right’s fear of modernity
and its allegedly authoritarian (and anti-Semitic) interwar nostalgia, contrasting it
with the left’s continual reformism. The text was not well received, as Gyurcsány’s
biography contained every element that confirmed the right’s view that regime
change had compensated, rather than punished, communists: A former President of
the Organization of Young Communists, Gyurcsány successfully pursued a career
in the private sector during the 1990s, and by 2002, was among the fifty richest
people in Hungary (Origo 2002). His next attempt to tackle the past, following his
2006 election as prime minister, had to be more conciliatory, and began with a
crucial acknowledgment: both left and right had skeletons in their closets—and the
left had consistently attempted to link the right to an authoritarian threat, but the
memory of communism was indeed fresher. The essay, titled “Confrontation,” not
only admitted the left’s symbolic deficit, but made no attempt to salvage any
positive features of the regime, such as its unprecedented social mobility and
modernization drive (Kiss 2015, pp. 249–255).
While victorious in the 2002 and 2006 parliamentary elections, the past would come
back to haunt the socialists. In a leaked recording of a private party meeting released
shortly before the fiftieth anniversary of the 1956 revolution, Gyurcsány admitted lying
about the country’s crumbling finances to ensure the 2006 re-election. For many on the
right, the prime minister had lied and tampered with the election just as the communists
had routinely done in the past. For an entire month, Budapest witnessed the worst
episodes of violence since 1956, with protesters demanding Gyurcsány’s resignation.
As the country plunged into the worst legitimacy crisis of post-communism, protesters
successfully recreated some of the key moments of the 1956 rebellion. Most notably,
hundreds of angry rioters broke into the Hungarian state television headquarters,
demanding the broadcast of a nationalist manifesto—much in the same way the 1956
revolutionaries had occupied the Hungarian state radio headquarters to demand auton-
omy from Soviet rule.
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While Gyurcsány only resigned in 2009, to be replaced by a caretaker government,
Orbán would use the time leading up to the 2010 election to appropriate the symbolic
capital of 1956 and drive a stake through the socialists’ legitimacy. Schmidt, by then
board chairman of Hungary’s media union and an active media commentator, put all
her weight as a historian behind the strategy, widening the resonance of the unfinished
revolution narrative:
“The party-state elite was not replaced when the regime changed. The socialist-
liberal coalition … restored the power positions of the old elite of state-run
operators, beneficiaries and servants within the government and the public sector
… Twenty years after the regime change, the old communist elite holds almost
every key position.” (Schmidt 2009).
In 2010, Orbán would win his so-called “revolution in the ballot box,” with an
unprecedented two-thirds majority, on the promise to rid the country of the remaining
traces of its communist past. In 2013, Fidesz would create an additional two memory
institutes that began eroding Schmidt’s monopoly on memory-making: the Veritas
Historical Research Institute, the Research Institute and Archives for the Study of the
Regime Change, and the Committee of National Remembrance.
Romania
Nicolae Ceaușescu’s reclusive and nationalist regime, lasting from 1965 until his
execution in 1989, was terminated by a violent revolution that brought about a semi-
presidential democracy. The new regime barely promoted transitional justice measures,
apart from a hasty removal of communist statues and symbols, with no prosecutions for
crimes committed under the previous regime. Lustration laws, passed several times,
were seldom implemented and repeatedly declared unconstitutional (Horne 2017, p.
101), whereas the settling of political scores drove informal attempts at lustration. State
structures, political parties, and a significant portion of the population have consistently
opposed a prosecutorial approach to the past (Tănăsoiu 2008, p. 89): as recently as
2010, 78% of Romanians did not even think they or their families had suffered under
communism (Iacob 2015, p. 417).
However, there has been no lack of transitional justice demands. The revolution
witnessed the rapid emergence of the National Salvation Front (NSF), a group com-
prising mostly systemic insiders who initially presented themselves as a supra-partisan
collective. The NSF’s self-labeling was rejected by a self-styled “democratic opposi-
tion,” a combination of nationalist conservatives and civic liberals who refused any
compromise with forces associated with the past (Tănăsoiu 2008, pp. 83–84). Instead,
they advocated an immediate recovery of the nation’s memory, namely through
demands to reveal Securitate (secret police) files and implement a three-legislature
ban of all former communist activists and officials. However, in May 1990, voters
effectively rejected this agenda by electing NSF head Ion Iliescu as president. A former
communist who would serve three terms (1990–1992, 1992–1996, and 2000–2004),
Iliescu would establish himself as a towering figure in Romanian politics.
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Iliescu’s opponents have persistently insinuated that his personal biography is at the
root of a pervasive “state amnesia” regarding communism (Stan and Tismăneanu 2015,
pp. 26–27). Head of the propaganda department in the 1960s, Iliescu fell out with
Ceaușescu in the 1970s, continuing to serve at the county level without openly
opposing the regime. His opponents saw this period, described as “punishment” by
Iliescu, as an unforgivable show of allegiance to the regime—although only a handful
of Romanians had engaged in oppositional activity. Their belief in Iliescu’s complicity
with communism became pivotal to the liberal conservatives’ strategy for the 2000
presidential election. Iliescu hoped to regain power following the presidency of liberal
Emil Constantinescu (1997–2000) who, tellingly, had done little to confront the past
himself. Despite official enquiries into Iliescu’s activities as county leader and alleged
Securitate collaborator, state archives failed to corroborate the opposition’s accusations,
and Iliescu won the election (Stan 2002, p. 57).
Iliescu’s return to power was a blow to liberal conservatives, who advocated
confronting the past. Romania’s best-known scholar, Vladimir Tismăneanu,
would rise as the most prominent voice among them. Better known to Western
academic audiences as a professor of political science at the University of
Maryland and former editor of the peer-reviewed journal East European Poli-
tics and Societies, Tismăneanu simultaneously pursued various forays into
politics. Born into a family of underground communists—his father fought in
the Spanish Civil War and became chair of the Marxist-Leninism department at
Bucharest University—Tismăneanu endorsed both the regime and reformist
Marxist ideas as a graduate student and student leader. However, his family’s
deteriorating political position eventually created obstacles to his career, precip-
itating his decision to leave an increasingly repressive Romania. Ultimately
settling in the United States at the height of the Reaganite Cold War in
1982, Tismăneanu dropped his neo-Marxist leanings and gained recognition as
an expert on Romanian matters in both media and academic circles. During the
1980s, he was appointed at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the
University of Pennsylvania, while relentlessly attacking Ceausescu’s regime
from platforms such as Radio Free Europe (Poenaru 2013, pp. 113, 127).
Post-communism would catapult Tismăneanu into the role of liberal conservative
opinion maker in Romania, a country he believed had “shunned the vital historical
soul-searching needed for a real national therapy” (Tismăneanu Tismaneanu 1993, p.
310). Iliescu, having recognized communism as a failed utopia, refused to attribute
Romania’s structural problems to the existence of former communist networks. In
contrast, liberal conservatives believed precisely those networks, symbolized by
Iliescu’s continuing power, were responsible for the failure of post-1989 reforms,
which were perceived as “cosmetic, minimal, always in danger of being reversed by
the former communist ruling elite” (Tănăsoiu 2008, p. 85).
Tismăneanu’s much-awaited opportunity to usher in a national “soul searching”
would come following the victory of liberal conservative Traian Băsescu in the 2004
presidential election. A former low-ranking member of the communist apparatus, who
lacked any dissident pedigree, Băsescu sought to refashion himself as an anticommu-
nist. In 2005, his conservative coalition partners had been responsible for establishing
the Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes (IICMER). With one-third of
the parliament composed of prominent communist-era figures, Băsescu was keen on
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avoiding lustration3 and instead opted for creating the Presidential Commission for the
Study of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania, entrusting it with an official and
“scientific” assessment of the communist past (Ciobanu 2009, p. 333). The commission
and the memory institute represented rival attempts to monopolize the symbolic capital
of anticommunism, but crucially, Băsescu named Tismăneanu as commission head to
bolster his initiative’s scientific legitimacy.
Albeit not a historian himself, Tismăneanu (Tismaneanu 2003) was instrumental in
shaping Romanian historiography, owing to his interpretation of Romania’s regime as
“National-Stalinist.” The field was generally weak, with research on the communist
period consisting mainly of diaries, memoirs, oral history interviews, or assortments of
documents, which revealed a lack of knowledge regarding the treatment of sources,
little interest in theoretical and methodological issues, and inclination for event-based
political history (Petrescu and Petrescu 2007, pp. 319, 365, 370–371). This resulted in a
crude positivism whereby scholars explained the regime’s survival on the basis of
police brutality, while omitting “legitimate sources of power, their movements, and
their evolutions” (Laignel-Lavastine 2004, p. 162).
As head of the commission, Tismăneanu selected nineteen members on merit of
either their scholarly qualifications or, more importantly, their commitment to anticom-
munism. This was the case for Nicolae Manolescu, a leading liberal politician and
literary critic who, as a student of philology in the 1960s, was expelled from Bucharest
University for criticizing the regime. The commission also included eighteen remuner-
ated experts who, in another boost to the commission’s scientific capital, were given
unprecedented access to previously restricted archives.
During a rowdy parliamentary session that included swearing, booing, and the
waving of banners, Basescu presented the 700-page document as providing a scientific
basis to condemn communism. The report offered an insight into an antitotalitarian
approach that has remained prevalent in Romanian historiography. The regime is
characterized as Stalinist from the beginning to the end, with party ideology manipu-
lating every aspect of citizens’ lives. All aspects of regime repression were examined,
mostly at the expense of revealing its social bases of perpetuation (Iacob 2015, pp. 438–
439, 454). The report also externalized communism as “antipatriotic … totally surren-
dered to Moscow and hostile to national political and cultural values.” Furthermore, the
commission’s report ensured past and present were connected: It claimed communism
fell “only officially” in 1989, positing that its structures, methods, and mentalities
“continued to exist under different guises, some extremely pernicious” (Tileaga Tileagă
2012, pp. 467, 472). The text made 28 references to Iliescu, including in a short
biography accompanied by those of other apparatchiks, and accused him of “cultivating
methods similar to those practiced by communists, the demonization of civil society and
democratic parties, symbolic manipulation, unscrupulous propaganda” with the intent
“to strangle the frail pluralism born on December 1989” (cf. Hogea 2010, p. 23).
A subsequent controversy, during which critics accused Tismăneanu of using his
influence on editors to suppress criticism of the report (Hyperliteratura 2013), is illustrative
of his growing influence at the time. Several left-leaning figures, among them historian
3 A recent investigation by the National Council for the Study of Securitate Archives, CNSAS, found Băsescu
to have been a Securitate informer and collaborator - a decision upheld by a Romanian court (Gascón Barberá
2019).
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Michael Shafir and former conservativepolitician Daniel Barbu, compiled the most prom-
inent critique of the report in 2008, titled The Illusion of Anticommunism. Its authors accused
the commission of factual inaccuracies, conceptual leaps, and an overemphasis on intellec-
tuals. Furthermore, they directly attacked Tismăneanu for ignoring criticism from peers
while engaging with easily rebuttable reproaches originating in the far right. Despite
Illusions being authored by previously published, established authors, no publishing house
in Romania would circulate the book, which was finally released in neighboring Moldova
(Poenaru 2013, pp. 145–156). Responding to the accusations, Tismăneanu would reaffirm
the scientific primacy of archives, noting that Illusions “did not rely on any archival research
and engaged in an ideological, not scholarly, critique” (Stan and Tismăneanu 2015, p. 35).
In 2010, Tismăneanu was appointed head of IICMER, the hitherto rival initiative to
the commission where, in line with regional trends, he would pursue a strictly scholarly
and educational approach to anticommunism: If, in previous years, the memory
institute had consistently, but unsuccessfully pushed for prosecuting possible commu-
nist crimes, Tismăneanu veered it towards implementing commission recommenda-
tions. For instance, IICMER produced an elective high school history textbook and
launched websites on topics such as Ceaușescu’s politics of reproduction, biographies
of the nomenklatura, and Iliescu-suppressed miner protests. In an intimation of what
was to come, Tismăneanu also cited his report as “Romania’s contribution to the
creation of a collective, transnational memory of the crimes of communism in a united
Europe” (Stan and Tismăneanu 2015, p. 31), becoming an active participant in the
Europeanization of antitotalitarianism.
From diffusion to Europeanization
Memory institutes found fertile ground in regions with a shared history of communism
and of blurred lines between politics and the intelligentsia, popping up, with varying
degrees of political and financial support, virtually everywhere from Estonia to Albania
and Ukraine. Their ubiquitousness raises two questions, the first of which can be posed
in terms of their diffusion: how did it occur and what was so new and unprecedented that
made these memory institutes politically appealing? The second question, which flows
from the first, asks what kind of power arrangement was brought about by this diffusion.
As the outlined cases show, the paths leading to the creation of memory institutes, while
distinctive, have consistently been grounded in variants of the “unfinished revolution”
narrative, one that has engaged numerous communities of historians. However, the novelty
of these institutes cannot be reduced to the creation of a space between politics and
historiography, as such spaces obviously predate their conception. Instead, memory insti-
tutes came to be perceived as valuable instruments to regulate the overlapping space
between the political and historiographic fields. Direct and constant politicization of mem-
ory, so characteristic of the 1990s, had produced popular fatigue and, in the case of
lustration, proven politically risky, precipitating the normalization of socialist parties.
Memory institutes helped solve this dilemma: struggles over the meaning of the past persist
in the public imagination, but the political right disavows direct responsibility for their
perseverance; instead, it is now often assumed by memory institutes. This arrangement has
successfully excluded many critics of the state-sponsored narrative; critics whose limitations
emanate from the structure of the fields they navigate. In the political field, communist
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successor parties remain symbolically crippled and their criticism easily dismissed as self-
serving, whereas liberals have lived in fear of aligning too closely with reviled “former
communists.” Within underfunded historiographic fields, scholars remain vulnerable to
cooptation, with only the most scientifically autonomous and prestigious being able occa-
sionally to voice public criticism.
Pivotal to this arrangement are anticommunist entrepreneurs, who connect the interests
of previously disconnected actors by overseeing capital exchanges; the most important of
which sees scholars grant scientific legitimacy to the narratives of political elites in
exchange for higher salaries, greater public visibility, or access to archival sources.
Political elites, on their part, obtain scholarly validation for their “unfinished revolution,”
outsourcing a central dimension of political competition onto institutions that promise a
monopoly on the symbolic capital of anticommunism. The specific set of abilities that
anticommunist entrepreneurs contribute, which require reaching and connecting disparate
actors in order to sustain a coherent message across fields, has thus been pivotal to the
viability of the power arrangement represented by memory institutes. As the biographies
of Kurtyka, Schmidt, and Tismăneanu have shown, this skillset is rooted in a hybrid
habitus, rather than being an innate gift—a habitus formed through a professional
trajectory spent in various fields relevant to memory making. As anticommunist entre-
preneur Andreja Valič Zver, director of Slovenia’s memory institute, put it:
I worked many years in schools and in faculties, I know the educational area, I
know what is in history textbooks, and this helps a lot. I also was very much
involved, and still am, in history teachers’ projects, associations, I knowwhat their
problems are when it comes to dealing with totalitarian regimes and crimes. Then
at the level of historiography I am the author of history textbooks, monographies,
articles. We always have to evaluate our work and question ourselves in the field
of historiography. Then there are judiciary issues, we need to study judiciary
methods, this is where the political contacts are important, these levels are always
living in a kind of political environment, they are mingled with politics. (p.c. 2012)
Considering the idiosyncrasies of national political, judicial, educational, and historio-
graphic fields, memory institutes have proven remarkably malleable. The BStU in
Germany provided a first source of inspiration for politicians, activists, and historians
who sought responses to the heated topic of handling secret police archives (Hans
Altendorf, p.c. 2013), but it would be Poland’s IPN that would inadvertently serve as a
laboratory of best and worst practices for keen regional observers. The IPN’s strong
prosecutorial profile and lustration prerogatives had invited accusations of political
targeting and careless archival work, from which anticommunist entrepreneurs drew the
lesson that combining lustration with historical research was politically sensitive (Pavel
Žáček, p.c. 2012). From this point onwards, memory institutes no longer thrive in a
relatively isolated national setting, but develop with increasing awareness of the
experiences and knowledge accumulated by peers elsewhere.
As governments established successive memory institutes throughout the 2000s,
focus progressively shifted onto research and public education, with an ever-growing
pool of “lessons” and “experiences” for newcomers such as Romania’s IICMER (2005)
to experiment with:
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We needed the expertise of other institutions … we were more interested in
public education, they [Czechs, Germans, and Lithuanians] were making summer
schools, contests and trainings for children, educational materials, somehow we
started looking at what they are doing and we started doing similar things …
[From Lithuania we took] a contest for children with essays about what commu-
nism meant, there were thousands of essays, and three years later we went to
Budapest and a historian told us the communists were doing the same thing, the
children will look in the books and bring you the official history as is written now
… this is not the way to do this and we stopped this. (Raluca Grosescu, p.c. 2013)
Such formal and informal exchanges engendered a tight milieu of historians and public
educators, who increasingly met under the aegis of memory institute-sponsored events.
Particularly important was the 2005 IPN conference, “The Communist Security Appa-
ratus in East Central Europe 1944/45 to 1989,” which brought 350 participants to
Warsaw at a time when only six memory institutes existed:
This conference was influential in the way of thinking in other countries, it
provided some patterns to be followed. But creating such institutes required
political positions. We offered some modus operandi to follow, some examples
… Contacts can start informally between historians, and they are brought to the
institutional level. The milieu of historians researching the secret police is not so
big, we know each other from conferences and other events … when we meet it
turns out we have very similar problems, the reaction to our activities is quite
similar: problems with public opinion, reactions to the opening of files, so we
have very common and similar experiences which integrate us. (Krzysztof
Persak, p.c., January 2013)
This transnational network of historians was pivotal to the establishment of the
European Network of Official Authorities in Charge of the Secret Police Files in
2008. The network was established to provide members, including strictly archival
state institutions, with mutual archival access, opportunities for joint research, and a
knowledge pool of public education practices. By the late 2000s, what had begun as a
loose and informal community was thus giving way to an institutionalized network.
The 2004 EU accession of eight post-communist countries would begin to affect this
arrangement, with anticommunist entrepreneurs increasingly persuaded that the Euro-
peanization of antitotalitarianism held the potential to provide further legitimation and
umbrage to their cause. Diffusion had served its purpose: memory institutes had
benefited from a common knowledge bank without interfering in each other’s “national
backyards.” EU accession was about something else.
Europeanization is a process of political integration by which social fields become
detached from their close links to the central institutions of the nation-state and are
reoriented towards a new European entity (Schmidt-Wellenburg 2017, p. 437). The
tension here is obvious: Europeanization required memory institutes to reorient their
allegiances partially from previously overriding, domestic discourses to a new common
goal, one calling for deepened cooperation and a laborious discursive streamlining.
Examples of potential sources of friction abound. While in both Romania and Hungary
Theory and Society
the theme of an “unfinished revolution” was key to political competition, this narrative
had liberal backing in Romania, which was unthinkable in the Hungarian context.
Moreover, in the small Baltic nations, anticommunism rarely implied a hidden clique,
instead expressing opposition to Russian influence on its populous minorities, usually
in the form of communist-era “mental schemes” (Ronaldas Račinskas, p.c. 2013).
Reconciling these multiple sources of friction required a novel power arrangement,
one that is best described as a relatively autonomous field.
Europeanization as field emergence
The Eurocratic field incorporates all actors dedicated to European integration and the
functioning of EU institutions (EP, European Council, lobbyists, etc.). Their actions
have been described in terms of multiple, cumulative compromises that gradually
establish a common frame of ideals, procedures, historical references and political
culture (Georgakakis and Rowell 2013, pp. 3–6). Anticommunist entrepreneurs’ efforts
in this field had two principal dimensions: Firstly, by leveraging many of the institu-
tional mechanisms deployed by their Western precursors in enshrining a European
memory of the Holocaust, they sought an EU-level condemnation of communism;
secondly, by establishing an institutional foothold in the European Union through the
Platform of European Memory and Conscience, they engendered novel, joint
practices—such as the travelling exhibit—that aimed to protect their institutes from
domestic political contingency. Crucially, they found a conjuncture that was ripe for an
EU-wide reckoning with communism. In 2007, the European Union approved a law
against Holocaust denial just as the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall
approached. Post-communist countries demanded provisions against the denial of
“communist crimes” in vain, but successfully compelled EU justice commissioner
Franco Frattini to organize a public hearing on Stalin-era crimes, thereby introducing
the topic of Nazi-communist equivalence into the EU agenda (Rees 2010, p. 231).
More importantly, a favorable political constellation yielded the support of the rotating
EU presidencies4 of Slovenia (2008), Czech Republic (2009), Hungary (2011), and
Poland (2011). Friendly governments were at the helm of all four presidencies, while
their temporal proximity proved decisive to a sustained intervention deep into the
Eurocratic field.
The Czech Republic assumed a leading role in these initiatives. An active and
transnationally oriented dissident community had occupied a prominent space in the
country’s politics, being overrepresented within the foreign policy establishment
(Waisová and Piknerová 2012). Among many transitional justice measures, former
dissidents were additionally responsible for establishing the Institute for the Study of
Totalitarian Regimes (USTR). Created in 2007, the Czech memory institute immedi-
ately assumed an internationalist orientation, often by the hand of anticommunist
entrepreneur Neela Winkelmann. While less connected to historiography proper than
her peers, her political, civic, and academic experience, as well as her knowledge of
4 The Rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU changes every six months, among EU member states, and
is responsible for directing the agenda and operations of the Council of the EU, the upper house of its
legislature.
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foreign languages, catapulted her to this transnational endeavor. The granddaughter of
Jaroslav Heyrovsky, the 1959 recipient of the Nobel prize in chemistry, Winkelmann
spent her life moving among Czechoslovakia, Germany, India, Malaysia, and the
United States, where, in 1997, she earned a PhD in molecular biology at Cornell
University. An environmental activist in the 1980s and a member of the Academic
Senate of Charles University’s Faculty of Sciences between 1990 and 1992, she was
appointed head of the Green Party’s energy section and subsequently ran as their
candidate for the 2004 EP elections. In the following years, she would serve Senator
Martin Mejstřík (2005–2008), a former anticommunist dissident, 1989 student leader,
and one of the drafters of the law establishing the USTR.
Once appointed as USTR’s project coordinator, Winkelmann began a conscious
effort to relocate transitional justice efforts away from a frustrating domestic realm and
onto a European “playing field”:
All these constraints we have here [Czech Republic], the judiciary that doesn’t
work, the communists in parliament, it was clear for us we need to … achieve a
European understanding that communism is as despicable as Nazism and it
should be condemned internationally.… we tried all kinds of approaches, we
met victims of the regime, we had political meetings, we had legislative initiatives
that never succeeded, we spoke to students at schools… we realized this is a new
dimension that enables us to create our own new playing field at the European
level … we have all been hitting obstacles so much on our local turf that this is
our new playground. (N. Winkelmann, p.c. December 2012)
Winkelmann’s plan to elude domestic political contingency was easily aligned with the
interests of key actors located in the Eurocracy. Friendly EU presidencies hungry for
content and topics offered memory institute historians the chance to come to Brussels to
present in conferences and public hearings on totalitarianism as part of their presidency
agendas.5 MEPs rich in symbolic capital gained through anticommunist dissidence,
such as László Tőkés, Vytautas Landsbergis, and Sandra Kalniete, shared the memory
institutes’ commitment to an EP resolution on Nazi and communist crimes, and
expressed interest in the scholarly legitimation they could provide.
In 2011 the cooperation between MEPs and anticommunist entrepreneurs gave way
to a distinct division of labor, expressed in a dual organizational structure: With a
supportive resolution from the EP and funding from the EC and various post-
communist states, Winkelmann formed the Platform as a Brussels-based umbrella
organization for memory institutes. Simultaneously, approximately forty MEPs joined
forces to set up the informal parliamentary grouping “Reconciliations of European
Histories” and promote the antitotalitarian agenda on the EP level. This dual structure
once again projected anticommunist entrepreneurs into an interstitial zone, where they
facilitate exchanges among domestic political patronage, historians, and now also
presidencies and MEPs in the Eurocratic field. For these European actors, memory
5 Friendly EU Presidencies have organized several similar events, with titles such as “Crimes Committed by
Totalitarian Regimes,” “European Conscience and Crimes of Totalitarian Communism,” and “What do Young
Europeans know about Totalitarianisms?”
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institutes have become “basically their think tank, we are their scholars, their legitima-
tion for their political demands, because when it comes from us it is justified, it has a
backing” (Winkelmann, p.c. 2012). Further, anticommunist entrepreneurs’ intermediate
position within this new division of labor reveals the dominant capitals structuring the
field of anticommunism: on the one hand, MEPs anti-communist symbolic capital
holds considerable sway and prestige, also outside field boundaries. Undoubtedly, its
holders represent the powerful faction of the field. However, as Winkelmann highlight-
ed, this symbolic capital requires “backing,” precisely what memory institute historians
provide through their scientific capital. Forging networks that reach into politics,
academia, and the Eurocracy, and mobilizing them into struggles against “commu-
nism,” anticommunist entrepreneurs occupy a central, if relatively anonymous, position
in the field by possessing both capitals and, crucially, through their ability to exchange
and combine them.
The setup of a cross-sectoral and transnational alliance was, however, anything but
spontaneous, requiring a strenuous discursive streamlining symptomatic of a space of
mutual recognition, contest, and cooperation. In the wake of the “European Con-
science and Communism” conference hosted by the Czech senate in June 2008, six
months before the country would take the rotating EU presidency, anticommunist
entrepreneurs and leading anticommunist politicians jointly drafted the Prague Decla-
ration (2008). Its naming implicitly paid homage to the 1985 Prague Declaration, sent
by pro-European Czech dissidents to a peace congress in Amsterdam. While the 1985
variant called for a united, demilitarized Europe (Waisová and Piknerová 2012, p. 170),
the 2008 declaration similarly demanded a united Europe, only this time founded on the
recognition of communist and Nazi ideologies as “inseparable.” Specifically, the
declaration advocated an international day of remembrance for the victims of both
regimes, continent-wide parliamentary acknowledgment of “Communist crimes as
crimes against humanity,” and an “adjustment and overhaul of European history
textbooks.”6 In a significant symbolic victory, organizers secured the support of one
of the greatest figures of liberal anticommunist resistance worldwide, Václav Havel.
His signature not only signaled liberals’ abdication to a conservative-inspired
antitotalitarianism, but buttressed anticommunist entrepreneurs’ claims to represent
the will of the region.
However, Havel’s endorsement proved insufficient to stifle dissent in what was a
relatively heterogeneous alliance. The Prague declaration’s call for “scientific and
educational” approaches to the memory of communism led Tismăneanu to term it as
“the fulfillment of the second stage of post-communist development” (2010, p. 133),
however, many natural allies refused to endorse it publicly. On the one hand, conser-
vative hard-liners like Schmidt found the declaration “did not emphasize enough the
crimes of communism” (p.c. May 2013). On the other, a group of pragmatic anticom-
munist entrepreneurs feared the text’s many parallels between communism and Nazism
would alienate potential partners dealing with Holocaust memory, whose enlisting was
key to securing funding from the Europe for Citizens Program, the EU’s only mech-
anism dedicated to commemorative projects (Littoz-Monnet 2012, p. 1195). In the
words of a Lithuanian anticommunist entrepreneur, the parallels were “wrong
6 The first draft was prepared by Swedish conservative politician Göran Lindblad, formerly in the Council of
Europe, and Mejstřík, with contributions from Winkelmann and Tismăneanu (Raluca Grosescu, p.c. 2013).
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tactically, it’s shooting one in the foot, giving arguments to opponents.…We are losing
very strong and very important support from Jewish and Holocaust research circles
who would not accept this equalization” (Ronaldas Račinskas, p.c. 2013).
Tensions flared again during negotiations over the agreement establishing the
Platform as an umbrella organization for memory institutes and their allies.
Winkelmann successfully retained the totalitarian terminology favored by conserva-
tives against the concerns of several liberal-minded scholars, who had to concede the
term, with all its flaws, “rings a bell with the public” (Bogdan Iacob, p.c. February
2013). However, due to pressure from the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
pragmatic partners such as Germany’s BStU, the document strayed from the Prague
declaration by underscoring the “exceptionality and uniqueness of the Holocaust.”
Conservatives met the allusion with “a huge uproar: people were saying ‘why should
we mention the Holocaust’ or ‘if we mention the Holocaust we have to mention the
Gulag.’” Schmidt reportedly lamented the agreement: “I am so ashamed. I have my
Prime Minister [Orbán] … tomorrow I am going home and have to explain why [I
signed this]” (Bogdan Iacob, p.c. 2013).
The episode reveals the Platform’s relatively autonomous position between the
Eurocracy and domestic political fields, each prescribing its respective interests, yet
without fully imposing them: Domestic political fields require memory institute spon-
sors to push antitotalitarianism in a bid to delegitimize the former communist left, a
strategy that implicitly calls the exceptionality of Nazism into question by equating it to
communism. In contrast, Holocaust uniqueness is a guiding principle of the Eurocratic
field, and recognition of this uniqueness remains a prerequisite for obtaining logistical
and financial support outside narrow post-communist circles. The formal upholding of
both antitotalitarianism and Holocaust uniqueness failed to satisfy fully either liberals
or conservatives, but Schmidt’s dissatisfaction is particularly telling of a momentous
shift in the region’s memory politics: The most visible face of Hungary’s powerful
memory regime, one assembled on the Terror House’s communist-Nazi equivalence,
had failed her prime minister and bowed to pressure from a relatively autonomous
European center.
The balancing acts between liberalism and conservatism, nationalism and Europe-
anization, and scholarship and political activism, remain effective. Composed of sixty-
two members, including memory institutes, private foundations, and NGOs, the Plat-
form has become the governing structure of an autonomous field of anticommunism.
Autonomy is secured particularly via EU and other external funding,7 with the Platform
either pooling resources for common projects—such as an “anti-totalitarian reader” to
be used as a teaching aid—or helping members coordinate applications. While the
Europe for Citizens program has consistently privileged Holocaust-related projects,
memory institutes’ involvement in legally binding transnational projects limits hostile
governments’ potential to shut them down. Conversely, projects’ adherence to EU
standards circumscribes any friendly cabinet’s ability to politicize their domestic
implementation (Bogdan Iacob, p.c. 2013).
The Platform’s ability to enlist EU allies—and thus increase the autonomy of the
field it governs—is, however, curtailed by both internal and external forces. Internally,
7 Other organizations that have supported memory institute projects include USAID, British Council and the
Konrad Adenauer Foundation.
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the platform’s code of ethics has established a set of explicit membership criteria, most
notably that its members do “not knowingly employ… former functionaries with paid
political jobs in totalitarian political structures” (Platform 2012ab). The criterion led to
the suspension of the leading force behind the Platform’s creation, the Czech memory
institute, which was accused of being “infiltrated by Communist collaborators” due to
leadership changes ordained by a newly elected leftist senate (Platform 2014). These
acts of “purification” underscore the Platform’s principled operation, one that contrasts
with politics’ porousness to immoral and opportunistic compromises with
“communists.”
Externally, the Platform is often perceived as overtly political, and its upholding of
Holocaust uniqueness insincere. A failed attempt by the Federal Foundation for the
Reappraisal of the SED (East German) Dictatorship to join the Platform provides a
telling account of the limits for contestation imposed by the field, a field whose
representatives periodically define through practice “the common interests underlying
conflicts of interest” as well as “all the undiscussed and unthought areas tacitly kept
outside the limits of the struggle” (Bourdieu 1975, p. 34):
It was obvious that their real interest was with the communist past, and that they
were only interested in taking Nazism and WWII into their research institutes to
justify the comparison. [They] tend to argue that taking Soviet and Asian
communism together it has more victims than National Socialism and thus is in
a way more evil.… We felt it was kind of a usurpation of history and of dealing
with history. Not in a consensual way, but just to follow your political tasks.…
They were not happy about what we said and they don’t invite us anymore.
(Ulrich Mählert, p.c. 2013)
Previously, the EP resolution on European conscience and totalitarianism had triggered
the most discernable critique of the antitotalitarian coalition in Europe. In one of the
competing motions that preceded the resolution’s adoption, Socialist MEPs argued that
“official political interpretations of historical facts should not be imposed by means of
majority decisions of parliaments.” Further, the MEPs noted that “20th century history
of Europe is very complex and ambivalent, as are people’s memories of it” (European
Parliament 2009b). While the latter amendment was not adopted in the final version,
the socialists were successful in including various warnings against the political
instrumentalization of history, while simultaneously replacing the terminology of
“communist” with “Stalinist” crimes (European Parliament 2009a). However, even
the final version was displeasing to several Socialists MEPs. In the words of British
MEP Glyn Ford, the resolution included “elements of a historical revisionism that flies
in the face of a demand for objective analysis” and “threatens to dilute the unique
nature of the Nazi crimes” (European Parliament 2009c).
However, none of these outlined concerns seems to have gained political traction. A
September 2019 EP resolution on the importance of European Remembrance for the
future of Europe, while still referencing Holocaust uniqueness, contained various
references to “crimes of totalitarian Communist regimes.” In addition, it directly
blamed the Nazi-Soviet Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact for the outbreak of World War II,
in line with the historiography advanced by memory institutes, and it called for greater
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EU support for the activities of the Platform. Ultimately, anticommunist entrepreneurs
seem to have been favored by renewed concerns among liberals and conservatives
related to Russia’s influence in Europe. The resolution denounced Russian efforts to
“distort historical facts and whitewash crimes committed by the Soviet totalitarian
regime,” which have been deemed “a dangerous component of the information war
waged against democratic Europe that aims to divide Europe.” Most significantly, the
declaration failed to call for any caution against the political instrumentalization of the
past, as had been the case in 2009 (European Parliament 2019).
Conclusion
This article shows that the various national trajectories of communist extrication and
recent efforts to Europeanize an antitotalitarian “collective memory” are more
entangled than had been previously claimed. This entanglement has its origins in the
2000s, when anticommunist entrepreneurs, a group of committed anticommunists who
straddle the boundary between politics and academia, converged on the need for a
“revolution” that would unseat powerful and hidden “former communist” networks.
Faced with the need to mobilize a relatively indifferent public, anticommunist entre-
preneurs proposed a public education offensive in the form of memory institutes. The
symbolic capital of anticommunism, previously up for grabs in the political field, is
now regulated and apportioned by institutions that seek to legitimate scientifically the
“unfinished revolution.” By occupying the interstitial space between politics and
historiography, memory institutes thus created a “thick boundary,” a space of transac-
tions and alliances that has nonetheless lacked the autonomy and oppositions that typify
a field.
The diffusion of memory institutes did not considerably alter this social
topography, that is, until anticommunist entrepreneurs began identifying oppor-
tunities to rework the existing power arrangement through EU membership. If, in
the past, anticommunist entrepreneurs were only accountable to their domestic
political patrons, they could now play the contradictory pulls of the Eurocratic
field and domestic politics off each other. While driven by a shared goal of a
European condemnation of communism, the need to organize these pulls, trans-
lated into ideological (liberal vs conservative) and tactical (“Holocaust unique-
ness” versus “totalitarianism”) oppositions, provided the fundamental impulse for
field emergence—one that, over time, has produced autonomous governing
bodies, a distinct division of labor between holders of anti-communist and
holders of scientific capital, and specific membership rules.
While the field of anticommunism imposes sacrifices and compromises on its
members, its power to retain them lies on the promise of a scientific and
“European” legitimation for antitotalitarianism: With every symbolic victory at
the European level, every regional show of unity, every step towards a homog-
enized narrative, communism is reaffirmed as totalitarian, as unchanging in time
and space, inclusive of its “covert,” post-communist incarnations. By extension,
the already fragmented domestic resistance to antitotalitarianism, whether by
liberals, social democrats, or historians, is “provincialized” in the face of a
European consensus. Hence why, even under this new arrangement, politicians
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have every incentive to reduce political control while maintaining material,
political, and logistical support for memory institutes; after all, the legitimacy
of their principal product, scientific capital, rests on an ideal of autonomy, one
that now finds validation in “Europe.”
By leveraging the hybrid professional trajectories of anticommunist entrepre-
neurs, this article identifies the prerequisites for field emergence in the linkage
between structure and practice. Following field theorists, field emergence is
temporally situated in the wake of a momentous historical transformation (the
transition from state socialism and accession to the EU) and topographically
located interstitial spaces (the thick boundaries among politics, historiography,
and the Eurocracy). Following organizational sociologists, the article offers
insights into the recombinant abilities of (in this case, anticommunist memory)
entrepreneurs, whose competence in merging political, historiographic, and
Eurocratic practice fulfills the generative potential of the interstitial spaces they
occupy. Their trajectories highlight, on the one hand, anticommunist entrepre-
neurs’ ability to create novel power arrangements, and on the other, the ground-
ing of their entrepreneurial abilities, not in some innate skills, but in a hybrid
habitus that reflects their position in the social structure. This is not to claim
these skills are structurally given, but merely to highlight that some degree of
overlap between their hybrid professional trajectories and the social structure is
likely a prerequisite for these entrepreneurial skills to transpire. In describing the
dynamics of emergence of the French literary field, Bourdieu noted its early
protagonists became aware of a “political conjuncture which, grasped through the
categories of perception inherent in their dispositions, allows and encourages
their inclination to independence (Bourdieu 1996, p. 60).Schmidt, Kurtyka,
Tismăneanu, and Winkelmann share a disposition shaped by their constant
navigation of field intersections; what makes them exceptional is their ability
to exploit that unique habitus in their common quest for autonomy: by balancing
the contradictory pulls of political discourse and scholarly production, by recon-
ciling the imperatives of domestic politics with the quest for scientific and
European legitimation, all the while exploiting, rather than succumbing, to these
frictions. Their generative balancing act is what the emergence of a field of
anticommunism ultimately encapsulates.
Future research on field emergence would do well to examine its potentially
hybrid protagonists, not out of an ontological affirmation of the primacy of
agency, but as a hook from which to fathom the structural transformations and
contradictions from which fields emerge. One promising line of inquiry would
be transnational fields, such as the one described here, created to produce the
sort of autonomy that a “thick boundary” lacks. Rather than involving a
functional reformulation at the level of the interests, practices, or actors oper-
ating in the spaces traditionally occupied by memory institutes, the field of
anticommunism offers a “vertical” autonomy that extends the geographical
scope of interactions. This extension occurs by fusing the resources produced
by various national and dependent interstitial spaces, reattracting them to a new
geographical level (Europe) without fundamentally altering the modality of
“domestic” practices. In other words, the field’s innovation is not to be sought
at a functionally different sphere of practice, but rather at a distinct
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geographical level within the same practice sphere (Buchholz 2016, pp. 41–42).
With the growing availability of transnational spaces as relief valves from
domestic limitations, one can expect transnational fields to emerge according
to similar patterns, whereby practices and actors are fundamentally preserved,
yet empowered by a geographical upscaling.
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